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1. Background
1.1. Cognition
The term “cognition” refers to the mental processes by which knowledge is
acquired and managed, including attention, intuition, perception, memory and
working  memory,  judgement  and  evaluation,  reasoning  and  computation,
problem  solving  and  decision  making,  comprehension  and  production  of
language.  These  processes  have  been  analysed  in  various  fields,  from
philosophy  to  psychology,  from  cognitive  science  to  neuroscience,  and
computer science as well and in each of these domains different aspects of it
have been taken into account.
Although the term “cognitive" concerns all the aspects of thought, conscious
and unconscious, it should be highlighted that reason and thought are mostly
unconscious,  largely  metaphorical,  imaginative,  and  emotionally  engaged.
Actually,  the  cognitive  unconscious,  the  place  where  all  our  beliefs  and
knowledge  in  terms  of  conceptual  systems  reside,  which  shapes  how  we
conceptualise and comprehend our experience as well, constitutes the 95% of
all thought1. The analysis of mind remained the province of philosophy until
the nineteenth century when experimental psychology, the study of sensation
and  perception,  memory,  cognition,  learning,  emotion,  developmental
processes, social psychology and their neural substrates,  developed.
1 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
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1.2. The mind-body dualism
In a very quick overview of the mind-body dualism, Gibbs (2006) points out
that the Western intellectual tradition began with the Ancient Greeks who have
always denied the body in the study of thought2. 
In 400 BCE Plato argued that the body came from the material world, while
the soul from the world of ideas (or forms), thus it is immortal. As body and
soul are temporally united, they will be separated with death. Besides since
soul does not  exist  in time and space,  it  is  a disembodied state,  and it  can
access universal truths which are recalled by the souls eventually considering
the body as a distracting element for intellectual life.
Later on, in 300 BCE, Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, claimed that the mind is a
faculty of the soul and that the relation between body and soul was not that
complicated: he considered the soul as a property of the body, and as the body
perishes so the soul does.
Afterwards,  in  the  17th century,  Descartes,  a  French  philosopher  and
mathematician, focused his attention on the pineal gland, where he positioned
the soul and the development of all the thoughts. His hypothesis, the so-called
Cartesian dualism, supports the distinction between mind and matter (body),
but  simultaneously  the  influence  of  the  former  upon  the  latter,  eventually
forming an empirical unit. Descartes’ argument for this separation is part of a
long  legacy  of  dualistic  thinking,  in  which  Plato’s  discussion  about  the
immateriality of  the  soul  played  a  central  role.  However,  for  the  Cartesian
philosophy, the body is both necessary and unacceptable because he claimed
that  the  body is  just  an  idea  in  the  mind that  materializes  only if  we pay
2 Gibbs,  R.  W.,  2006,  Embodiment  and  cognitive  science,  Cambrige  University  Press,
Cambrige
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attention to it: he doubted its existence,  but not the one of the thought and
thinking.
During the 18th century Kant claimed the fact that beyond mind and matter
there exists a world of a priori forms, such as time and space, which are pre-
programmed in the brain. Therefore, as it is believed by this philosopher, the
interaction mind-body occurs through forces that may be of different kinds for
mind and body.
At the beginning of the 20th century Piaget, in his writings on developmental
psychology, explored how embodied action may underlie children’s acquisition
of perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Indeed children learn to reason about
the  physical  world  through  visual  inspection  of  real-world  events,  their
interactions with objects and other people.
However, over the last fifty years in philosophy, the nature of cognition has
been re-thought: instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols,
this new approach focuses on the fact that cognition is rather a situated and an
embodied activity suggesting that thinking beings ought to be considered first
and foremost as active beings. Thus, this new view claims that most real-world
thinking occurs in very particular environments, is employed for very practical
purposes, and exploits the possibility of interaction with and manipulation of
external objects. 
Besides, over the last decades a division in cognitive sciences seems to have
emerged between advocates of embodied approaches and those who support
symbolic procedures to language understanding. While the former group thinks
that language comprehension requires the activation of our experiences with
the world, the latter one argues that it should rely on interdependence of words.
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1.2.1. Two generations of cognitive researchers
In order to examine in depth these two conceptions of cognitive science, two
generations of researchers have to be distinguished3. 
The first generation of cognitive science developed between the 1950s and
the  1960s  claiming the  idea  that  reason was disembodied  and that  thought
could be represented using formal symbol systems. With respect to meaning, it
was  considered  simply  as  an  abstract  relation  among  symbols  or  between
symbols  and  a  state  of  affairs  in  the  world.  This  view  was  based  on
functionalism that supported the idea that mental representations are symbolic
and that mind could be studied in terms of its cognitive functions, ignoring
which  functions  arise  from  the  body  and  brain.  Thus,  according  to  this
“functionalist” perspective, body and brain do not contribute to the nature of
human concepts and reason.  
Whereas the second generation of cognitive science developed in the mid-
late 1970s sustaining the idea of a strong dependence of concepts and reason
upon the body and the centrality in conceptualisation and reason of imaginative
processes,  namely  metaphor,  imagery,  metonymy,  prototypes,  frames  and
mental spaces. Moreover its three major findings are the fact that the mind is
inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious, and abstract concepts are
largely metaphorical. Thus, its key points are the following: 
• conceptual structure arises from our sensorimotor experience and the
neural  structures  that  give  rise  to  it:  the  neural  and  cognitive
mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our
conceptual systems and modes of reason;
• mental  structures  are  intrinsically  meaningful  by  virtue  of  their
3 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
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connection to our body and embodied experience;
• our  brains  are  structured  so  as  to  project  activation  patterns  from
sensorimotor  areas  to  higher  cortical  areas  through  the  building  of
primary metaphors;
• reason is embodied and arises from the nature of our brains, bodies and
bodily  based  experiences;  consequently,  inferences  arise  from
sensorimotor and body-based forms of inference.
1.3. Embodiment
Actually,  since  the  mid-1980s  the  concept  of  embodiment  has  been  used
extensively  in  the  cognitive  science  and  AI  literature,  in  such  terms  as
embodied  mind4,  embodied  intelligence5,  embodied  action6,  embodied
cognition7, embodied AI (Chrisley, in press), and embodied cognitive science8.
Nowadays, embodiment is considered a condition sine qua non for any form
of  natural  or  artificial  intelligence:  Pfeifer  and  Scheuer9 argued  that
“intelligence  cannot  merely exist  in  the  form of  an  abstract  algorithm,  but
4   Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its  
challenge to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
5 Brooks, R. A., 1991, Intelligence Without Reason Proceedings of the Twelfth International
Joint  Conference  on  Artificial  Intelligence  (pp.  569-595)  San  Mateo,  CA:  Morgan
Kaufmann. 
6 Varela, F. J.; Thompson, E. & Rosch, E., 1991, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and
Human Experience Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7 Clark, A., 1997, Being There - Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
8 Clark, A., 1999, An embodied cognitive science?, Trends in cognitive science, 3
9 Pfeifer, R. & Scheier, C., 1999, Understanding Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
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requires a  physical  instantiation,  a  body”.  Nevertheless,  it  is  far  from clear
what kind of body (if any) is required for embodied cognition; hence, while it
might  be  agreed  upon  that  humans  are  embodied  cognizers,  there’s  little
agreement  upon what  kind of  body artificial  intelligence would  have  to  be
equipped  with.  Indeed  Ziemke,  in  its  paper  “What’s  that  thing  called
embodiment?”10, claims that it is then necessary to distinguish between several
notions of embodiment:
• embodiment as a structural coupling between agent and environment
• historical embodiment as the result of a history of structural coupling
• physical embodiment
• organismoid embodiment
• organismic embodiment
• social embodiment
The broadest notion of embodiment is that systems are embodied if they are
structurally coupled to their environment: Quick et al.11 stated that a system X
is embodied in an environment E if perturbatory channels exist between the
two. This means that X is embodied in E if every time at which both E and X
exist, some subset of E’s possible states with respect to X have the capacity to
perturb X’s state, and some subset of X’s possible states with respect to E have
the capacity to perturb E’s state.
Some researchers emphasized that the embodiment of cognitive systems is a
result or reflection of a history of agent-environment interaction and in many
10 Ziemke, T., 2003, What's that thing called embodiment? In R. Alterman, D, Kirsh (eds.) 
Proceedings of the 25th annual meeting of Cognitive Science Society, Lawrence Erlbaum, 
NJ, pp 1305-1310.
11 Quick, T. & Dautenhahn, K., 1999,  Making embodiment measurable, Proceedings of ‘4.
Fachtagung der Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft’, Bielefeld, Germany.
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cases co-adaptation. Riegler12 argues that a system is embodied if it has gained
competence within the environment in which it has developed.
Historical and physical embodiment, after all, are special cases of structural
coupling  and,  in  a  more  restricted  view,  the  embodied  systems  should  be
connected to their environment, not just through physical forces, but through
sensors  and  motors:  sensorimotor  embodiment,  then,  should  be  taken  into
account. 
A more  restrictive  notion  of  physical  embodiment,  the  organismoid  one,
argues  that  certain  types  of  organism-like  cognition  might  be  limited  to
organism-like  bodies  covering  both  living  organisms  and  their  artificial
counterparts.
The notion of organismic embodiment claims the fact that only living bodies
should be taken into account because living organisms are autonomous and
autopoietic,  while  man-made  machines  are  heteronomous  and  allopoietic.
Living organism are acting plans, whereas machines are governed by human
rules. However this notion does not rule out the possibility of future artificial
autopoietic systems that can grow in interaction with their environment through
the use of artificial evolutionary and learning techniques.
Barsalou  et  al.  (in  press)13,  instead,  have  addressed  the  notion  of  social
embodiment by which they mean that states of the body, such as postures, arm
movements  and  facial  expressions,  arise  during  social  interaction  and  play
central roles in social information processing.
12 Riegler,  A.,  2002,  When  is  a  cognitive  system embodied?  Cognitive  Systems  research,
special issue on “Situated and embodied cognition” 3, 339-348.
13  Barsalou, L. W., Niedenthal, P. M., Barbey, A. K., & Ruppert, J. A., 2003, Social 
embodiment in B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 43 (pp.
43–92). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
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Therefore, the recent interest linked to the pair body-mind has increased and
the hypothesis that bodily experiences play an essential role in the development
of mind, in the cognitive development has been widely approved. 
In  the  term  “embodied  cognition”  the  term  “body”  highlights  that  the
cognitive development is related to the development of motor functions and
their management to reach special purposes. In the light of this view, cognition
is rooted in the body and develops from the perception of our physical being.
Thus,  there  is  a  very close  link  among perception-action-cognition  and the
notion of mind, of thought that arises and develops from the interaction of the
body with the environment, in contrast with the cognitivist view that dominated
the period after the war. This connection between motor aspects and cognitive
functions is also established by Lieberman14 who observed that basal ganglia
that control complex motor actions, play a role in cognitive activities such as
language.  Action,  perception  and  cognition  are  three  aspects  of  the  same
function: interacting with the world. 
Consequently,  the  knowledge-awareness  of  ourselves  in  the  sense  of
regulation  and  control  of  our  inner  states  and  the  capacity  to  coordinate
movement and intentionality is the premise to develop an embodied cognition. 
1.4. Embodied cognition
The concept of embodied cognition recalls the argumentation that states that
we are creatures whose cognitive activity is primarily related to sensorimotor
processing connected to on-line interaction with the external world. Indeed, the
evolution of the brain and the senses has been driven by immediate needs of
embodied  creatures,  hungry  for  information  and  inseparable  from  their
14 Lieberman  P.,  2000,  Human  Language  and  Reptilian  Brain:  The  Subcortical  Bases  of
Speech, Syntax, Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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immediate environments. Biology demonstrates that mental life has physical
basis  in  the  synapses  of  the  brain.  Actually  on-line  aspects  of  embodied
cognition  include  cognitive  activities  embedded  in  a  task-relevant  external
situation, involving time pressure too. However, off-line aspects are significant
to assist in the mental representation and manipulation of things that are not
present making the body serve the mind. Nonetheless, even if this hypothesis
has been widely supported, it is important to take into account the different
views that interpret the notion of embodied cognition. Wilson examined them
in her article15:
1. Cognition is situated: cognitive activity involves perception and action
because it takes place in real-world environment. Situated cognition is
based  on  the  fact  that  one  person’s  action  is  not  rooted  in  one’s
knowledge,  but  it  comes  from  the  web  of  social  relationships  that
defines the context of our action, thus it is the cognition that takes place
in the context of task-relevant inputs and outputs. Our ancestors relied
mostly on situated skills because before civilization the most important
problem to deal with was an immediate reaction to avoid predators and
find food. As early humans became more sophisticated the use of off-
line measures increased (shaping tools, language and depictive art), but
situated cognition has not disappeared. Actually, spatial cognition tends
to be situated, because for instance, trying to fit a piece into a puzzle
may need continuous revaluation of spatial relationships that are being
continuously manipulated.
2.  Cognition is time pressured: cognitive activity needs to be considered
in relation to the pressures of real-time, that matter because they create
what has been called the “representational bottleneck”. When situations
need fast responses, there may not be time to build a mental model of
the environment from which to derive a plan of action. Humans usually
15  Wilson, M., 2002, Six views of embodied cognition, Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9,
pp. 625-636.
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crumble under time pressure and they do not successfully cope with the
representational  bottleneck.  Actually,  given  the  opportunity,  they
choose  to  behave  in  an  off-line  way.  Anyhow,  forms  of  real-time
situated cognition can be seen in any activity that involves a continuous
updating  of  plans  in  response  to  the  continuous  changing  of  the
situation.
3. We off-load  cognitive  work  onto  the  environment:  in  this  way,  our
cognitive work is reduced. Indeed when we are dealing with on-line
tasks,  two  kinds  of  strategies  can  be  used:  the  first  is  to  rely  on
information acquired in previous situations, while the second is using
the  environment  itself  in  a  strategic  way  in  order  to  reduce  our
cognitive  workload  making  use  of  epistemic  actions  to  alter  the
environment and help cognitive processes. 
4. The environment is part of the cognitive system: in order to study the
cognitive activity, mind and environment have to be both of them taken
into consideration. Cognition is distributed across the entire interacting
situation: from the mind, to the body and the environment.  Thus, to
understand cognition we need to study the situation and the situated
cognizers together as a unified system.
5. Cognition  is  for  action:  cognitive  processes  contribute  to  situation-
appropriate  behaviour.  Works  on  memory  and  perception  are
meaningful for this claim because the aim of the visual system is to
build  an  internal  representation  of  what  is  perceived  externally:
consistent with this view, the ventral  and dorsal visual pathways are
considered  to  be  the  “what”  and  “where”  ones  which  generate
representations of object structure and spatial relationships respectively.
Nevertheless, the dorsal stream is thought to be the “how” pathway as
well. Our mental representations are often sketchy and incomplete, but
they contain  more  information  than  the  one  needed  for  the  original
purpose, thus they’re useful for future activities.  
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6. Off-line cognition is body based: cognitive mechanisms are grounded in
the mechanisms developed from the sensorimotor interaction with the
environment. Mental structures that were built for perception or action
can be useful to off-line tasks, different from their original purpose, to
assist in thinking and knowing. Therefore sensorimotor simulations are
implicated  in  human cognition.  Mental  imagery,  not  only the  visual
one, but the auditory and the kinesthetic imagery as well, take place in
the absence of relevant external simulation. Working memory appears
to be an example of symbolic off-loading, it off-loads information onto
perceptual and motor control systems in the brain. Episodic memory
(long-term memory) stores spatiotemporally localized events with all
the attendant visual, kinaesthetic and spatial impressions. There also is
implicit  memory  that  can  be  considered  as  an  embodied  form  of
knowledge because through it, we learn skills, automatizing what was
formerly  effortful.  The  internal  representations  of  the  situation
automatized contain certain regularities that allow us to circumvent the
representational  bottleneck.  Finally  reasoning  and  problem-solving
should  be  taken  into  account  because  they  make  a  heavy  use  of
sensorimotor  simulation.  It  appears  then  that  off-line  embodied
cognition is a widespread phenomenon in the human mind.
1.5. Embodiment and language analysis
In linguistics, the notion of embodiment was introduced in connection with the
following problems:
• How can we understand each other?
• How do we get to the same shared meaning?
• How can we be sure that we are thinking the same thought as a result of
our communication?
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In order to find a response to these questions about language and semantics
Rohrer16 distinguished  two  approaches.  On  the  one  hand  philosophy  and
linguistics  that  posit  meaning  as  something  abstract,  propositional  and
symbolic and consider complex language as the result of a logical combination
of  atomic  propositions.  This  is  a  method  adopted  by  most  of  the  analytic
philosophers  of  language  and  Chomskian  linguists  who  consider  semantics
purely referential and syntactic structures able to resolve to logic relations, and
pragmatics is seen as the first source of ambiguity, subjectivity and error. To
name two philosophers, Plato and Frege can be positioned within the extreme
forms  of  this  tradition:  the  objectivist  one.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are
researchers that in observing language as learned and used within the child-
parent pair where a single word has a pragmatic meaning and used to establish
a  relation  between  them,  found  that  the  first  purpose  of  language  is
communicate and share experiences and not merely objectively describing the
world.
Actually,  we know from Cognitive  Neuroscience  that  the  physical  brain
does not process visual information in a disembodied, nonimagistic way, but
instead maintains the perceptual topology of images presented to it, and then
re-represents  abstract  spatial  and imagistic  details  of  that  topology.  Thus  a
focus on what people find meaningful necessitates investigating the cognitive
and social embodiment that shapes and constrains meaningful expression. A
question  that  can  be  asked  is  how  does  bodily  apparatus  itself  shape  our
linguistic  categorization  and  conceptualisation?  The  spirit  of  this  transition
from the Objectivist traditions to a more Cognitive Semantics can be revealed
in  an  experiment  proposed  by  Langacker17 to  characterize  the  process  of
linguistic change known as subjectification. He makes an example about the
16 Rohrer, T., 2007,  Embodiment and experientialism, In  Geeraerts, D., Cuyckens, H. (eds.)
The Oxford handbook of Cognitive Linguistics Oxford, Oxford University Press.
17 Langacker, Ronald W., 1990, Subjectification, Cognitive Linguistics 1: 5-38.
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glasses he wears pointing out that if he takes them off and examines them they
function  solely as  the  object  of  perception;  by contrast  when he’s  wearing
them,  they  become  part  of  the  perceiving  apparatus,  thus  they  function
exclusively as part of the subject of perception.
The embodiment hypothesis is the claim that human physical, cognitive and
social embodiment ground our conceptual and linguistic systems. 
In the late 1970s Lakoff and Johnson18 discovered that much of the ordinary
language we use to characterize a wide variety of experiences is systematically
shaped by a relatively small number of metaphors. Thus this work called into
question the distinction between “dead” metaphors (deeply conventionalised
and thus hard to notice as we listen to everyday speech) and “live” metaphors
(the  inferential  and  creative  extensions  of  an  underlying  metaphor).  They
dubbed  the  notion  of  conceptual  metaphor  to  distinguish  it  from linguistic
metaphor emphasizing the fact that metaphors are a matter of cognition and
conceptual structure rather than a matter of mere language. Actually, metaphors
tend to refer to the abstract in terms of the concrete. They identify the more
concrete concepts as the “natural kinds of experience” and they are composed
of basic “experiential gestalts” which are the natural products of our bodies,
our interactions with the physical environment and our interactions with other
people in our culture. These three domains constitute the basic source domains
upon which metaphors draw.
Over the ensuing twenty years the notion of experientialism, embodiment
and  directionality  of  conceptual  metaphor  received  much  elaboration  and
surveys showed that bodily source domains were prevalent not only for the
semantics  of  English  but,  also  for  other  languages,  distant  from it  such as
18 Lakoff,  G.,  Johnson,  M.,  1980,  Metaphors  we  live  by,  University  of  Chicago  Press,
Chicago.
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Japanese  and  Mixtec19.  Sweetser20 has  argued  that  an  historical  semantic
change motivated by the embodiment  hypothesis  has  occurred within Indo-
European languages for metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING. Therefore
the  direction  of  the  semantic  change  is  for  languages  to  use  terms  for
perception as terms for knowing, rather than the contrary. We do understand
knowing as seeing thus this semantic change is motivated by the embodiment
hypothesis.
Furthermore,  in  the  preface  to  The  body in  the  mind,  Johnson  (1987)21
presents six bodies of evidence for the embodiment hypothesis including not
only cross-cultural research on metaphor and historical semantic change, but
work on prototypes in categorization, the framing of concepts, polysemy and
inferential patterns in metaphor as well. 
In the same year, 1987, Lakoff characterized experientialism (or experiential
realism22) as the core of embodiment including the internally genetic acquired
make-up of the organism and the nature of its interactions in both its physical
and social environments in the make up of actual or potential experiences of
either individual organisms or communities organisms. 
As the scope of embodiment enlarged, criticisms on its central tenets arose
highlighting  their  underspecification.  Johnson  tried  to  develop  a  theory  of
19 The Mixtec languages are a group of languages spoken in the Mexican states of Oaxaca,
Puebla and Guerrero, and in California in the USA.
20 Sweetser E., 1990,  From etymology to pragmatics: Metaphorical and cultural aspects of
semantic structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
21  Johnson, M., 1990, The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination and      
reason, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
22  Lakoff, G., 1987, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, University of Chicago Press.
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image schemata23, that is to say recurrent pattern, shape or regularity in, or of,
our  actions,  perceptions,  and  conceptions.  They  are  patterns  that  emerge
primarily as meaningful structures for us at the level of our bodily movements
throughout space, our manipulation of objects, our perceptual interactions. He
argued that  these patterns can be metaphorically extended to structure non-
physical,  non-tactile,  and non-visual  experiences.  An example  is  the  image
schema  of  CONTAINMENT that  we  can  find  for  instance  in  our  typical
morning routine: we wake up out of a deep sleep, drag ourselves up out of the
bed  and  into  the  bathroom.  Such  schemata  are  preconceptual  embodied
structures of meaning in two important ways:
• image  schemata  are  developmentally  prior  to  conceptual  thinking
because conceptual structure is accessible to us by means of language.
As  infants  we  experience  patterns  of  feelings  before  we  develop  a
linguistic self, but these structures are shared;
• Image  schemata  are  preconceptual  because  they  underlay  multiple
different conceptual metaphors.
Advocates  of  the  disembodied  mind  say that  conceptual  structures  must
have a neural realization in the brain which just happens to reside in the body,
but they deny that anything in the body is essential  for characterizing what
concepts are. On the contrary, Lakoff and Johnson argue that conceptual and
perceptual  processes  share  many  of  the  same  physiological  and
neurophysiological  subprocesses.  They claim that  in  an embodied mind the
same  neural  system  engaged  in  perception  (lower-level  activities)  plays  a
central role in conception (higher-level cognitive abilities)24.
23  Johnson, M., 1990,  The body in the mind: the bodily basis of meaning, imagination and
reason, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
24 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
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The term embodiment had a gradual evolution and expansion from simply a
hypothesis  about  the  grounding  of  conceptual  metaphors  to  one  which  has
grown increasingly large in scope throughout its dialogue with other branches
of cognitive science.
The body is conceived as a material and biologic entity, while embodiment
as  an  undetermined  methodological  field,  defined  by  the  perceptive
experiences and by the interaction with the world. Perception is an essential
embodied  experience  where  the  body  is  not  an  object  but  a  subject  and
embodiment  is  the  condition  necessary  to  build  the  objective  structure  of
reality. Moreover the embodiment hypothesis makes us understand our being-
in-the-world. Heidegger25 shows in his analysis, that this condition of being-in-
the-world that allows us to form disengaged representations of reality arises
from the fact that we are already engaged in coping with the world, dealing
with the things in it, highlighting the fact that even in our theoretical stance we
are  agents.  The  body  should  be  considered  as  the  raw  material  of  mental
representations and not the place of subjectivity. Metaphors, for instance, are
phenomena related to intelligent  bodies and represent  our experience in  the
world. The formation of embodied representations involves different sensory
faculties giving birth to multisensory images. 
Likewise Merleau-Ponty26, argues that perception and mental representation
always occur in the context of and are structured by the embodied agent while
he  is  interacting  with the  world.  Therefore representations  are  the  result  of
bodily  experiences,  possessed  of  content  already,  and  not  given  by  an
autonomous mind. According to him consciousness, the world and the human
body as a perceiving thing are intricately intertwined because the body is not
25  Heidegger, M., Macquarrie, J., & Robinson, E., 1962, Being and time, MA: Blackwell,  
Malden.
26 Merleau-Ponty, M., 2002, The Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge, New York. 
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only a thing, but is also a permanent condition of experience, a constituent of
the perceptual openness to the world demonstrating the primacy of perception,
then of experience. This one is unified into a single object of consciousness,
which has corporeity like the internationality of the body in contrast with the
dualist ontology of mind and body claimed by Descartes. 
There  have  been  neural  modelling  studies  that  have  analysed  which
configuration of neurons are involved in rational thought or rational inferences
and  whether  they  can  be  computed  by the  same  neural  structures  used  in
perception and bodily movement.  Upon this  topic  it  is  possible  to  notice a
differentiation between Western philosophical tradition and Cognitive science.
According to the former, our capacity to reason is what differentiates us from
animals,  and it  is  considered separated from our bodies and independent of
perception  and  bodily  movement;  reason  is  then  seen  as  transcendent,
independent of human bodies, therefore disembodied, making human concepts
objective categories of body-free reality. The latter, on the contrary, claims that
reason uses and grows out of such bodily capacity supporting the evolutionary
view and the  fact  that  reason is  embodied  because  our  bodies,  brains,  and
interactions with the environment provide the unconscious basis for our sense
of what is real, indeed shaped by both evolution and experience. In fact, reason
is  evolutionary,  that  is  to  say  that  human  beings  should  be  placed  in  a
continuum with animals, and not separated from them. It is necessary to state
that reason is not universal in the transcendent sense, but in the sense that it is
shared universally by all human beings thanks to the commonalities that exist
in the way our minds are embodied.
According to cognitive science,  then,  every living being categorizes as a
consequence  of  our  biological  make-up:  our  categories  are  mostly  formed
automatically  and  unconsciously,  they  are  conceptualised  in  terms  of
prototypes which correspond to neural structures in our brains making use of
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the  sensorimotor  system.  Therefore  the  locus  of  reason  is  the  locus  of
perception.
The body is eventually involved in conceptualisation, shaping its nature as
we can assume it  in analysing colour  concepts  or  spatial  relation concepts.
Colours  do not  exist  in  the external  world,  their  internal  structures  and the
relationship between them are tied to our embodiment, they are a consequence
of four interacting facts: lighting conditions, wavelengths of electromagnetic
radiation,  colour cones retinas and neural processing.  Light is not coloured,
only when electromagnetic radiations impinges our retinas and the surrounding
lighting conditions are right, our colour cones absorb the radiation producing
an  electrical  signal  processed  by neurons  circuits  of  our  brains  making  us
seeing colours. This is what is called neural embodiment27. 
As for  spatial-relation concepts,  researchers  talk about  phenomenological
embodiment.  Spatial-relation concepts  characterize what  spatial  form is  and
define spatial inferences, varying from language to language. They are used
unconsciously and via our perceptual and conceptual systems, mostly made up
of elementary spatial relations which have further internal structures consisting
of an image schema, a profile and a trajector-landmark structure. Among these
structures there are: 
• the container schema: given two containers, A and B, and an object X,
if  A is  in  B and X is  in  A,  then  X is  in  B;  this  schema is  can  be
physically  instantiated  as  a  concrete  object  (room)  or  as  a  bounded
region of space (football field);
• the source-path-goal schema: it is topological in the sense that the path
can be modified,  but  it  still  remains  a  path,  and trajectories  are  not
entities in the world but they are conceptualised as a trail left by an
27 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
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object that moves following a direction;
• bodily projections: refer to our body that define a set of fundamental
spatial orientations we can use to orient ourselves and to perceive the
relationships of one object to another (backs and fronts).
There exist three models which show that conceptual system makes use of
important  parts  of  sensorimotor  system  that  impose  crucial  conceptual
structure:
• Regier’s  model  (1996)28 for  learning  spatial  relation  which  is  both
perceptual and conceptual shows how neural structures in the brain that
do perceptual work can be recruited to do conceptual work as well;
• Bailey’s model (1997)29 for learning verbs of hand motion where motor
mechanisms  do  a  conceptual  work  of  categorizing  actions  for  the
purpose of naming them;
• Narayanan’s model (1997)30 of motor schemata, linguistic aspects and
metaphor discovering that the same neural structure that can perform
motor actions characterizes the conceptual structure and mechanisms
that allow us to perform logical inferences about the structure of actions
in general.
Brain tends to optimise on the basis of what it already has in order to add
only what  is  necessary.  Concepts have then evolved from our  sensorimotor
systems which have in turn evolved to allow us to function well in our physical
environment.  The embodiment  of  mind  leads  to  a  philosophy of  embodied
28 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
29 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
30 Lakoff, G., M. Johnson, 1999, Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge
to western thought , Basic Books, New York.
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realism that claims a level of physical interaction in the world at which we
have evolved to function successfully, that is to say that our embodied system
of basic-level concepts has evolved to fit the ways in which our bodies have
been coupled to our environment.
Gibbs31 argued that embodiment may refer to three levels of personhood:
neural  events,  the  cognitive  unconscious  and  phenomenological  experience.
This view of embodied mind has the following features:
• the concept of self is highly linked to tactile/kinaesthetic activity;
• embodiment  is  constituted  by  recurring  patterns  of  kinaesthetic
proprioceptive action that provide much of people’s experience;
• perception is linked to thought processes where objects are perceived
by how they may be physically manipulated;
• language reflects important aspects of human conceptualisation; 
• memory, mental imagery, problem solving are linked to sensorimotor
simulations;
• embodied experiences are shaped by cultural processes.
Our bodies,  then,  take centre  stage in  the empirical  study of perception,
cognition and language in cognitive science’s theoretical accounts on human
behaviour.
In  actuality,  in  order  to  survive,  human  beings  develop  patterns  of
interaction  with  the  environment  based  on  their  bodily  capacities  (senses),
culture and language. During this interaction, not all the information provided
are recorded, but just the needed ones, which actually can be different cross-
culturally because there can be differences in the perception of reality among
cultures.  De  facto,  our  perception  of  reality  is  inseparable  from  our
31 Gibbs,  R.  W.,  2006,  Embodiment  and  cognitive  science,  Cambrige  University  Press,
Cambrige.
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embodiment because the knowledge we have about the world is provided by
our sensory means (eyes, skin, fingers, tongue, mouth, nose).
This is what embodied cognition claims aiming at achieving three related,
but  distinct  goals  always  highlighting  the  importance  of  the  body  in  the
explanation of cognitive abilities: its first purpose is to demonstrate that the
body  structure  creates  constraints  for  neural  control,  that  is  that  symbol
manipulation emerges from the physical attributes of the body; its second goal
is to account for the content of cognition by appeal to the nature of the body
containing the brain, namely there are some basic concepts that stem directly
from  the  body  human  beings  have  and  the  manner  it  interacts  with  the
environment; thirdly it wants to demonstrate that cognitive processes could be
extended into the environment where the organism lives, becoming cognitive
friendly  in  the  sense  that  it  eliminates  steps  that  cognitive  tasks  would
otherwise require. 
Oppositely,  the  Traditional  Cognitive  Science  considers  thought  and
knowledge as  a  syntactically  determined manipulation  of  symbols,  in  other
words cognition receives inputs from the organism’s sense organs that translate
them into a syntactic code from the environment and send them to the nervous
system where they are manipulated according to various rules which are either
innate  or  learned,  therefore  cognition  begins  and  ends  with  inputs  to  and
outputs from the nervous system without interacting with the external world. 
Anyhow, afterwards we vehicle all that information processed by our brains
through language, which is part of our genetic endowment, using both literal
terms and figurative speech, namely metaphors.
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1.6. Metaphor and metonymy
Now that we have reached this point, metaphor and metonymy should be taken
into account and analysed because our conceptual system is metaphorical in
nature and because metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language,
but in action and thought as well, as Lakoff and Johnson claim in their work
“Metaphors we live by”32, and even if people are not aware of their conceptual
system, they think and act automatically. 
According to them metaphor is ultimately grounded in bodily experience
pointing out that human concepts are not just reflections of reality, they are
ultimately shaped by our bodies and brains, especially our sensorimotor data.
Human beings give central importance to their bodies since the beginning of
their  existence  using  body  part  terms  to  define  a  huge  part  of  our  daily
experience. For instance a lot of proverbs and idioms that contain body terms
may be considered as primary metaphors hidden in our long-term memory.
In  fact,  cognitive  science  considers  metaphor  and  metonymy  as  two
important  conceptual  processes:  the  former  involves  two different  domains,
meaning that a concept is understood in terms of another which belongs to
another semantic field, while the latter involves a single domain in which one
entity is described in terms of another within the same domain; further while
metaphor  is  characterized  by  resemblance  or  correlation,  metonymy  is  a
relationship of contiguity or proximity.
Metonymy is  a  figure  of  speech  and it  is,  loosely speaking,  a  stand-for
relation (X is used to stand for Y): the element that stand for another is the
32 Lakoff,  G.,  Johnson,  M.,  1980,  Metaphors  we  live  by,  University  of  Chicago  Press,
Chicago.
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vehicle  while  the  latter  one  is  the  target,  thus  the  vehicle  provides  mental
access to another conceptual entity, the target which is within the same domain,
then  it  can  be  considered  a  within-domain  mapping.  Actually,  some
representative examples in our culture are:
- THE PART FOR THE WHOLE
- PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT
- OBJECT USED FOR USER
- INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE
- THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION
Metonymy is a linguistic device that relies on frames, domains and Idealized
Cognitive Models (ICM) which are cognitive constructs which can refer to a
kind of knowledge structure which can serve as a background for interpreting
the meaning of linguistic forms. Anyhow there is sometimes an overlap in how
they are used by different  researchers:  frames paved the way for particular
theories of grammar; ICMs are a way for capturing the role of background
knowledge  for  certain  kinds  of  semantic  analysis  particularly  as  they  are
related to questions of categorization; domains play a central role in conceptual
metaphor theory and cognitive grammar33.
As regards metaphor, it is a basic phenomenon that occurs throughout the
whole range of language activity: it is a very common figure of speech, not just
a  mere  embellishment  to  create  more  singular  poems,  but  it  can  be
contemplated as a systematic pattern that permeates our everyday thoughts, our
everyday language,  our everyday interaction with the environment,  with the
objects,  with the other  people.  Though we are not aware of our conceptual
system,  we  think  and  act  along  certain  lines  everyday  more  or  less
automatically  and we can  find  in  language a  lot  of  evidence  for  what  this
33  Kovekses, Z., 2006, Language, mind and culture, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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system is like because communication is based on the same conceptual system
used in thinking and acting.  As a consequence the language we use to talk
about  some  aspects  of  a  concept  is  systematic.  Therefore,  studying
metaphorical expressions we gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature
of our activities.
For  instance,  considering  the  concept  ARGUMENT and  the  conceptual
metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, they are reflected in our everyday language
by a wide variety of expressions. We do talk about arguments that way because
we conceive of them that way, consequently we act according to the way we
conceive  of  things.  Therefore  the  way  of  talking  about,  conceiving  and
experiencing a situation is then metaphorically structured. For instance we talk
in terms of IDEAS ARE FOOD or THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. The “used”
parts of the concept of BUILDING used to structure the concept of THEORY
are  the  foundation  and  the  outer  shell,  while  the  rooms,  staircases  are  the
“unused” parts.
Three  subspecies  of  imaginative  (non  literal)  metaphors  can  be
distinguished34:
• extensions of the used part of a metaphor (e.g. bricks and mortar of a
theory);
• instances of the unused part of the literal metaphor (e.g. a theory with
thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors); 
• instances  of  novel  metaphors  which  are  new  ways  of  thinking  of
something  (e.g.  classical  theories  are  patriarchs  who  father  many
children).
Metaphor is then a basic process of word meanings formation: practically, it
34 Lakoff,  G.,  Johnson,  M.,  1980,  Metaphors  we  live  by,  University  of  Chicago  Press,
Chicago.
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